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With a few honorable exceptions, criminology has ignored a simple truth about crime 
-  that serious crime is predominantly committed by states and their officials.  State 
crimes are generally easy to recognize: genocide (though rarely in the early stages), 
war crimes, torture, police violence, and ‘grand corruption’—the organized plunder of 
national resources by a ruling elite. Other forms of state crime, however, are less 
recognizable: forced eviction, land grabbing, the avoidable effects of many natural 
disasters. The framework that we offer in this chapter seeks both to provide the 
conceptual tools to enhance ‘recognition’ and to explain state crime in a way that 
relates it to the disciplinary concerns of criminology while drawing on the 
contributions of other disciplines.  
The questions asked by scholars of state crime are essentially those major 
political and sociological concerns that have informed critical criminology for at least 
four decades and relate to the exercise of governance and abuse of power by state 
agents; the relationship between state, capital and crime; class, gender and ethnic 
relations and conceptions of justice and the challenge to state power from below. 
These concerns, however, have not been addressed exclusively by scholars who 
would embrace the label ‘critical’. For example a great deal of mainstream policing 
scholarship is concerned with abuses of state power and cannot avoid engaging with 
issues of class, even if not in the (neo-)Marxist spirit that pervades much of the 
overtly critical literature (see for example Hinton and Newburn 2009; Punch 2012, 
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2013). What distinguishes critical criminology is its central concern with 
demystifying state-defined conceptualisations of crime as a highly selective, class 
based censure of social harms. Critical criminology made clear in the 1980s that the 
harms of the powerful far outweighed the harms of the powerless, and that the 
criminal label was often employed by the state as a weapon against those sections of 
society which challenged it or its corporate allies. It took some time, however, before 
scholars committed to theorising state criminality and even longer before empirical 
investigations into state deviance were to be conducted on a serious and global scale.  
We are now witnessing a surge in scholarship that seeks to apprehend, 
interpret and expose the orchestrated harms of states and corporations (and often the 
confluence of both) as crimes.  This has involved the repositioning of traditional 
representations of the protagonists – so that conventional conceptions of the state as 
‘protector’ against, and victim of, crime are replaced by, or combined with, the often 
more accurate representation of the state as perpetrator of crime. Sophisticated, 
challenging and courageous methodologies now provide an increasingly powerful 
evidence base for state crime scholarship.  
We begin this chapter by discussing the vexed question of how to defined state 
crime.  We then discuss the extent of plainly criminal state activity in today’s world, 
before considering various approaches to the explanation of state crime and the 
methods by which criminologists can study it. 
 
 
defining state crime 
The notion of state crime raises some obvious definitional problems. First, what is a 
state? As Weber (1970) famously argued, states claim a monopoly of the legitimate 
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use of force in their territory.  Unpacking this definition, we can say that a state is an 
organization that both exercises, if not a monopoly, at least dominance over the use of 
organized force within some significant territory, and lays claim to political 
legitimacy. By these criteria, the ‘so-called Islamic State’ is indeed a state, and a 
criminal one. 
Like the study of corporate crime, state crime scholarship imputes criminal 
acts and intentions to group agents (List and Pettit 2011): groups of people whose 
actions are coordinated to achieve shared goals, in ways which presuppose the truth of 
certain beliefs about the world. States are complex and internally differentiated, and 
while in certain contexts they may be regarded as single agents it is often more 
realistic to impute acts and intentions to specific state agencies without supposing that 
they are shared by the state as a whole (ibid.: 40). Group agents may be nested one 
within another – a particular police squad may have shared beliefs and goals but may 
(or may not) also act in concert with other units to achieve the goals of the force as a 
whole. At times, and particularly in times of crisis (e.g. the UK miners’ strike: Green, 
1998) so many state agencies may be acting in a coordinated way that it is reasonable 
to treat ‘the state’ as a single group agent. 
What, then, is state crime? In this chapter we adopt a definition we have 
advocated elsewhere (Green and Ward 2000, 2004): it is organizational deviance, by 
state agencies (in the sense just explained), which violates human rights.  As Robert  
Agnew observes, our definition attempts to ‘integrate the essentialist and 
constructionist perspectives’ on crime (Agnew 2011: 29). The ‘essentialist’ element is 
an assumption that some acts are objectively harmful to human beings, and that 
human beings have prima facie moral rights not to be harmed in those ways. We can 
leave aside philosophical arguments about whether the existence of human rights is an 
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objective moral reality: it suffices to say that we (and, we hope, most criminologists) 
have a moral commitment to certain basic rights that we think states ought to respect. 
We can also leave aside Agnew’s view, shared by some state crime scholars (e.g. 
Rothe 2009), that international law provides an ‘objective’ definition of harmful 
behaviour. International human rights instruments do a reasonable job of categorising 
the sorts of harm with which we are concerned (torture, deprivation of liberty, denial 
of essential health care, etc.), but understanding the basic needs or interests of human 
beings as creatures capable of agency is not a matter in which social scientists need to 
defer to the law (see Doyal and Gough 1981).  
The ‘constructionist’ perspective on crime emphasizes that it is behaviour that 
is seen as harmful and wrong by the state and/or some significant social audience. In 
the nature of state crime, it is typically not ‘labelled’ or censured as culpable 
behaviour by the state itself. This labelling or censuring role is primarily played, 
rather, by a range of organizations that make up ‘civil society’: associations 
independent of the state with some capacity for formulating or advocating norms of 
conduct and disseminating information about their violation. The term ‘civil society’ 
is broad enough to cover international NGOs like Amnesty, local grass roots 
organizations, media outlets independent of the state, and religious bodies. Civil 
society can exist, and effectively censure and resist state crimes, even in repressive 
states that offer it little or no legal protection (Beyerle 2014: 16-17).1 
                                                          
1 This aspect of civil society was the subject of a research project by the authors and 
colleagues at the International State Crime Initiative: ‘State Crime and Resistance: A 
Comparative Study of Civil Society’ funded by Economic and Social Research Council grant 
no ES/I030816/1  (see Green and Ward, forthcoming). 
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  Some state crime attracts formal, legal censure from bodies such as the 
International Criminal Court, but this is comparatively rare (23 cases at the ICC up to 
the time of writing), and to confine our attention to these cases would be to take a 
very narrow view of state crime. The selection and processing of cases by 
international tribunals is, however, a fertile field for criminological inquiry (see e.g. 
Hagan 2003, Mullins 2011). 
Agnew (2011) offers his own combination of ‘essentialist’ and ‘constructivist’ 
perspectives which brings state crime within a comprehensive definition and 
classification of crimes. He proposes that criminologists should rank actions 
according to the degree to which they (1) amount to blameworthy harms, i.e. harms 
inflicted intentionally, recklessly or negligently and without justification or excuse; 
(2) are condemned by significant sections of the public; and (3) are subject to state 
sanctions. Acts which meet any of these criteria to a significant degree fall within the 
scope of criminology, but ‘core crimes’, the paradigmatic subject-matter of 
conventional criminology, rank high on all three. Agnew’s approach resembles ours 
inasmuch as he combines a human-rights based definition of harm with a recognition 
that either the state or the public may censure behaviour as harmful and blameworthy. 
He refers to both Kauzlarich and Kramer’s (1998) and our own (Green and Ward 
2004) work on state crime as examples of how criminologists might elaborate on the 
classification of crime that he offers. In this spirit, we would like to suggest that the 
most serious forms of state crime fall into a category not clearly recognized in 
Agnew’s own work. What may be termed ‘core state crimes’ are identical to Agnew’s 
‘core crimes’ – murder, rape, theft, etc., – except that, while clearly harmful, 
blameworthy, widely condemned and in most cases illegal, they carry little risk of a 
state-imposed sanction, at least in the short term. These ‘core’ crimes should be 
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distinguished – even if the dividing line is blurred – from, for example, ‘the 
intersection of global warming, governmental action – or inaction – and corporate 
behaviour in ways that produce state-corporate crimes of global warming’ (Lynch and 
Stretesky 2010: 71). Without questioning that this is an immensely important category 
of harm and of legitimate interest to criminologists, we do question whether it is 
helpful to equate it with genocide (ibid: 72). Core state crimes and ambiguously 
criminal state harms call for different kinds of analysis. We turn to the analysis of 
core crimes in the next section, but for reasons of space will touch only briefly on 
more ambiguous cases. 
 
THE MODERN CRIMINAL STATE  
State crime is ubiquitous. In 2014 Amnesty International recorded human rights 
violations in 160 of the world’s 196 states and territories and documented torture in 
131 of them.  
  We are all familiar with the ‘core’ crimes committed by states, even if we 
haven’t constructed them as such: the ongoing genocides in Sudan’s Darfur region 
and Burma’s Rakhine state; the Israeli bombing of Gaza in 2014; the US torture of 
Iraqi prisoners in Abu Ghraib; the brutality of Ben Ali’s Tunisian police state; the 
terror and corruption of the Egyptian ruling elite represent some of the more egregious 
acts of state crime. The scale of state killing and systematic theft by ruling elites is 
staggering and the organized and planned criminality of governments has resulted in 
immeasurable pain and suffering. Yet the shroud of secrecy, official resistance, and an 
ideological/juridical culture which confines hegemonic understandings of criminality 
to the actions of the powerless results in an absence of state crime statistics, a 
misplaced sense of public fear, and a resistance within criminology to invoking the 
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state as perpetrator. Even for those crimes acknowledged in international law—
torture, genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes—governments have 
shown at best only a selective interest in monitoring and measuring. There is no doubt 
that impunity, secrecy, and a lack of political will impose enormous challenges to the 
accurate recording of state criminality. 
The few attempts there have been to quantify the scale of state crime are 
inevitably challenged by these complexities. R.J. Rummel, nonetheless, has 
calculated that 262 million people died between 1900 and 1999 through the 
‘murder of any person or people by a government including, genocide, politicide 
and mass murder’ (Rummel n.d.). While the great majority of these murders 
(around 85%) occurred in China (under both Communist and Nationalist regimes), 
the USSR, the Third Reich and the colonies of the European powers, there are 
numerous other regimes who contributed at least hundreds of thousands of deaths 
to the century’s record of carnage. 
There have been a number of more recent attempts to quantify the state murder 
of civilians in individual conflicts. One of the most notable is that conducted by the 
NGO, Iraq Body Count (2011). They estimated that state, militia, and insurgent 
killing resulted in between 99,704 and 108,856 violent deaths of civilians in Iraq 
between the 2003 invasion and January 2011. When the Wikileaks Iraq War Logs 
data on 15,114 new civilian deaths is added, the total figure of estimated civilian 
deaths rises to 123,960 (www.iraqbodycount.org/analysis/numbers/warlogs/). The 
Syrian Center for Policy Research has calculated that since the beginning of the war 
in 2011, 470,000 Syrians have been killed (SCPR 2016) and according to the Syrian 
Network for Human Rights (whose estimated death toll of civilians between March 
20111 and November 2015 was 180,879) 95% were victims of President Bashar Al 
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Assad’s forces.  In the course of Israel’s ‘Operation Cast Lead’ 23 day bombardment 
of Gaza between December 27 2008 and January 18, 2009, approximately 1,440 
Palestinians were killed (over half estimated to be civilians), compared with 13 dead 
(including four civilians) on the Israeli side (Congressional Research Centre 2009). 
Mary Kaldor identifies human rights violations and war crimes (that is state 
crimes) as ‘a central methodology’ of modern armed conflict where politics frames 
rather than determines the ‘violent enterprise’ (Kaldor 2006:121–2). Instead of  
isolated actions of criminal soldiers or military units, crimes of war now extend to the 
core of modern armed conflict and are fuelled by looting, illegal trading in diamonds, 
minerals and timber, corruption, and transnational criminal networks (Green and 
Ward 2004). Moreover, as Kaldor observes, ‘we have good and accurate statistics for 
the deaths of men in state-based uniforms, but information about the vast majority of 
victims is totally inadequate’ (Kaldor 2013:9) 
If we combine these few attempts to quantify the scale of state crime with the 
vast and increasing body of work by human rights NGOs, journalists and academics 
from a range of disciplines it is clear that state violence and corruption can no longer 
be left in criminology’s hinterlands – rather, state crime should be central to any 
adequate definition of the scope of criminology. 
According to the World Health Organization (WHO) in 2000 some 310,000 
people were killed as a result of collective or war-related violence (2002: 10); this 
represented 20 per cent of all global violent deaths at the time. The WHO 
acknowledges that this figure, which excludes domestic deaths at the hands of police 
and security forces, is the tip of an iceberg given the secrecy and denial which 
envelops so much state violence. One measure of the states’ capacity for violence is 
military expenditure. Evidence from the Stockholm International Peace Research 
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Institute (SIPRI 2015) suggests that in 2014 world military expenditure (estimated at 
$1776 billion) represented 2.3 percent of world GDP. While overall global military 
spending declined by 0.4 percent between 2013-14 this was largely a function of 
decisions in the US, South America and Europe. China, Russia and Saudi Arabia all 
increased military expenditure substantially during the period (SIPRI 2015). 
  
Of course, not every death in war is the result of a war crime; the very idea of 
a war crime presupposes that some killing in war is lawful. Ruggiero (2005)  has 
argued for a pacifist criminology that would treat war itself as criminal. Such an 
approach would, however, ignore the very significant differences in the degrees to 
which states and insurgent forces seek to conduct their operations in a lawful manner. 
For example, ongoing research by Alicia de la Cour Venning2 explores the apparent 
adoption of IHL norms by Myanmar’s armed ethnic Kachin Independence Army in its 
long-running war with the Myanmar state. She seeks to determine how the adoption 
of these norms, within the context of an armed conflict, can be conceptualized as an 
effective strategy for challenging a criminal regime. The Myanmar state’s criminality 
is relevant as it characterizes the context within which the KIA must make decisions. 
Her research has the potential to extend state crime theory by investigating the extent 
to which compliance with international humanitarian norms impacts effective 
strategies of resistance to prolonged and brutal state criminality.  
                                                          
2 De La Cour Vening (2016) unpublished doctoral research, ‘To what extent do Kachin 
Independence Army perceptions of international humanitarian norms conform with 




EXPLAINING CORE STATE CRIME   
Brannigan (2013) highlights three features of genocide and similar mass atrocities that 
criminology needs to explain. The first of these ‘paradoxes’ is that atrocities are 
committed for the most part by ‘ordinary men’ (Browning 1998), and sometimes by 
ordinary women (see e.g. Sharlach 1999), in the absence of psychopathology, acute 
provocation or duress.  The second is that although most of these actions are 
recognized by national and international law as grave crimes, they are or have been 
‘conventionalized’, that is, they remain technically proscribed but are rarely punished 
(Carson 1979; Brannigan 2013: 32-3). It is this feature that chiefly distinguishes ‘core 
state crimes’ from ‘core crimes’ in Agnew’s sense, which attract severe state 
sanctions as well as public disapproval. The third ‘paradox’ is that the enormous ‘dark 
figure’ of state-instigated violence eclipses that of serious ‘street’ crime and yet it has 
received far less attention from criminology.  
Faced with these paradoxes, there are two ways that an attempt at 
criminological explanation can go. One is to suggest that atrocities are not, after all, so 
very different from other core crimes. In very broad and abstract terms, the same 
kinds of criminogenic factors are present: motivation, opportunity and an absence of 
effective control. What has to be taken into account in analysing state crimes is that 
these factors operate on several different organizational levels as well as the level of 
the individual perpetrator. This approach has been developed most systematically in 
the ‘integrated theory’ which underpins much of the state crime scholarship of the last 
two decades, especially in the USA (Kauzlarich and Kramer 1998; Mullins and Rothe 
2008). An analysis by Hoofnagle (2011) of mass murder and rape in Burundi provides 
a typical example of this approach.  She identifies motivational drives such as 
international economic policies; opportunities afforded by a chaotic situation, coupled 
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with unclear lines of command in the military; some limited  constraint on the 
violence  provided, albeit haphazardly, by international peacekeeping efforts; and 
some mechanisms of control, i.e. would-be deterrent measures taken after the event, 
which were not implemented effectively. While accounts such as this encapsulate a 
variety of causal factors in a way that is easily assimilated to mainstream 
criminological theory, they are open to criticism for being essentially descriptive and 
offering limited insight into any deeper and less easily legible process that might 
underlie the surface phenomena (Lasslett 2010). The use of parallels with ‘street’ 
crime is perhaps most productive when it yields insights into the emptional and 
interpersonal dynamics of extreme violence, as in Rafter’s (2016) recent work on 
genocide. 
Another response to Brannigan’s ‘paradoxes’ is to emphasise that core state 
crime is fundamentally different from other crimes by reason of its essentially 
conformist, rather than deviant, nature. In the phrase coined by Kelman and Hamilton 
(1989), they are ‘crimes of obedience’. As Smeulers puts it:   
a crime qualifies as a crime of obedience when it is supported by the authority 
structure…. This very fact turns the whole analytical framework which 
underlies criminological theory upside down ….[W]e have to focus on the 
question why [the perpetrators] are obedient, why  they followed the group, 
why they do live by the (deviant and immoral) rules. (Smeulers 2008: 236-7). 
Talk of ‘deviant rules’, however, raises the question as to whether this is really a 
complete inversion of mainstream criminology, rather than a variant of differential 
association theory. After all, employees of dishonest corporations and members of 
mafia-like organizations might also be said to live by deviant rules. 
The classic study of immoral obedience to authority is Milgram's (1974) 
notorious series of experiments (partially replicated by Burger 2009) in which a 
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majority of subjects were prepared to inflict what they were told were high-voltage 
electric shocks on another participant (in reality an actor). What can be learnt from 
Milgram’s seriously flawed and unethical experiments is a highly controversial 
question (Brannigan 2013, Russell and Gregory 2015). The artificial setting in which 
subjects were confronted with unexpected demands under the direct supervision of an 
authority figure (a white-coated ‘scientist’) cannot be considered a realistic model for 
the position of state-appointed torturers and murderers who must carry out extreme 
violence repeatedly over long periods, often without direct supervision.  
While highly critical of Milgram’s use of his findings to explain the 
Holocaust, Brannigan (2013) is also in the camp that sees mass atrocities in terms of 
conformity rather than deviance. Brannigan draws on the work of Elias (2000 [1939]) 
who related the monopolization of violence by European states since the middle ages 
to changing sensibilities regarding violence in everyday life. Although the relation 
between the two is not simple or direct, the concentration of legitimate violence in the 
hands of the state has developed hand-in-hand with the ‘civilizing process’ of 
increasing self-restraint by individuals in the exercise of violence and other bodily 
functions such as eating and sex. Brannigan argues that modern genocide must be 
understood as the actions of individuals who are ‘civilized’ in this sense. He disagrees 
with Elias’s (1987) suggestion that Nazi Germany witnessed a partial regression to 
‘barbarism’. Germany remained, he argues, a thoroughly controlled and, in Elias’s 
sense, a ‘civilized’ society; and the more recent genocide in Rwanda also occurred in 
the context of a tightly controlled, bureaucratic state. Brannigan sees genocidal 
behaviour as a form of deviance resulting from an excess, rather than a deficit of 
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control, paralleling Durkheim’s ‘altruistic’ and ‘fatalistic’ forms of suicide.3 There is a 
kind of altruism and the perpetrators’ sense of duty and commitment to the genocidal 
ideology of the state, and a kind of fatalism in the willingness to persist in genocide 
even in the face of inevitable defeat. 
Our own analysis of state violence (Green and Ward 2007, 2008) shares 
Brannigan’s debt to Elias but sees an important truth in Elias’s view that there are 
‘decivilizing’ counterflows at work within the ‘civilizing process’. Along with 
subjection to the state comes a licence to use violence creatively and autonomously in 
pursuit of the state’s goals. De Swaan’s (2001) concept of enclaves of barbarism 
captures this synthesis within an Eliasian perspective. For de Swaan, the key feature 
of the ‘bureaucratization of barbarism’ is the comparmentalization of the target 
population, the sites of torture or murder, the roles of the perpetrators, and their 
emotional experiences: 
wildness and brutality are let loose, or maybe even instilled, and at the same time 
instrumentalized, for specific purposes, within demarcated spaces at an appointed 
time: an archipelago of enclaves where cruelty reigns while being reined in all the 
while…. [T]he regime creates and maintains compartments of destruction and 
barbarism, in meticulous isolation, almost invisible and well-nigh unmentionable 
(de Swaan 2001: 269). 
 
Within these ‘enclaves’, including the Nazi concentration camps and the sites of mass 
slaughter in Rwanda, what takes place is not simply routinized, efficient killing but a 
wide variety of acts of extreme cruelty that go well beyond dutifully carrying out 
                                                          
3 In Durkheim’s explanatory scheme, altruistic suicides (driven by duty and self-sacrifice), 
derive from deficient individuation, while fatalistic suicides, such as those of slaves, derive 
from an excess of regulation (Durkheim, 1952: 217-21, 276 n.). 
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orders and owe much of their social meaning to their ‘excessive’ character (see for 
example African Rights, 1994; Sofsky, 1997).  
  The contradiction between ‘civilized’ sensibilities (in Elias’s sense) and the 
demands of the violent state is manifested most acutely when extremely repressive 
policies take roots in states that have experienced relatively liberal forms of 
democratic political rule. States of this kind have been the subject of several 
exemplary studies, including Schirmer’s (1998) of the Guatemalan military in the 
1980s, Huggins’ work on Brazilian torturers and murders (Huggins et al. 2002), 
Haritos-Fatouros’ (1988, 2003) and Gibson’s (1990) work on torture under the Greek 
junta, and the work of Feitlowitz (1998), Marchak (1999), and others on Argentina.  
Whilst there are many nuances and regional particularities, we can identify a 
number of general explanatory themes in this body of scholarship. The first is a 
tendency for states which engage in systematic state violence to promote a monolithic 
sense of cultural identity (e.g. the project of the architects of the Turkish Republic). A 
supposedly indivisible ‘imagined community’ (Anderson 1991) defines itself through 
exclusion of minorities whose claims to recognition and respect threaten the integrity 
of the monolith. When those claims take the form of active resistance against the state 
then clear ideological enemies are defined and the state may engage in a 
dehumanization process which excludes those enemies from the ‘universe of 
obligation’ (Fein 1990) within which ordinary moral rules apply. Monolithic cultures 
are frequently authoritarian in character and those agents of the state most likely to 
rise to its defence are found to be attracted to far right wing and fascist ideologies 
(Staub 1989). 
A second theme that emerges clearly from the psychological research is that 
most torturers and purveyors of state terror, who are for the most part psychologically 
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normal, require training, often of a very brutal and brutalizing nature, to counter long 
held socialized norms against the use of cruelty (Haritos-Fatouros 1988; Gibson 
1990). Specialized elite units, such as those to which virtually all torturers of the 
Greek and Brazilian regimes belonged (Gibson and Haritos-Faturos 1986; Huggins et 
al. 2002) also appear to be essential.  
The literature reveals, thirdly, that even when states portray torture and terror 
as essential to combat perceived threats to social order, there is a recognition on the 
part of state agents that this violence stands outside the bounds of political legitimacy 
(Cohen 1981; Green and Ward 2004). 
 Denial, of the various kinds analysed by Cohen (2001) is a ubiquitous 
response on the part of states whose wrongdoing is exposed. This is closely allied to 
neutralization (Sykes and Matza 1957), the difference being that neutralization occurs 
before or during the event rather after it. Techniques of neutralization enable 
perpetrators or instigators of state crime to make radical departures from conventional 
moral norms appear justifiable or excusable (Cohen 2001b; Alvarez 2010). New 
research is revealing exactly how states and corporations mobilize significant legal, 
financial and human resources, to conceal their illicit practices from public scrutiny. 
MacManus (2015) refers to a dialectical interplay between civil society condemnation 
and exposure of state-corporate crime and state-corporate practices of denial as a 
‘process of labelling and counter-labelling … conducted in the public’. In recent 
decades PR companies have been ‘routinely employed by governments for “crisis 
management”, i.e. to deal with any potentially damaging public reaction to perceived 
state deviance or crime.’ (MacManus 2015). 
The economic, strategic and political interests of the major powers are also 
important in sustaining criminal practices and their denial, as can be seen in the cases 
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of Israel and Myanmar.  According to the Congressional Research Service Israel is the 
‘largest cumulative recipient of U.S. foreign assistance since World War II’. In 2015 
the US administration funded Israel to the tune of $ 3.7 billion -  $ 3.1 billion in direct 
bilateral military aid with a further $619.8 million for ‘joint’ U.S.-Israel missile 
defence programs. US support directly enables Israel’s well documented crimes in the 
occupied West Bank and Gaza (extrajudicial killings, ethnic cleansing, forced 
evictions, illegal settlements, apartheid against civilian Palestinians (Sharp 2015)).  
In Myanmar, where the state is in the process of a genocidal campaign to 
annihilate its ethnic minority Rohingya population (Green et al 2015), the regional 
powers, China and India, have ignored the plight of the Rohingya as they seek to 
exploit Myanmar’s natural resources with, for example, the Shwe gas pipeline and the 
Kaladan Multimodal Transit Transport Project  - projects which will benefit 
Myanmar’s rulers but not the inhabitants of the country’s second poorest state (Green 
et al 2015). 
 
  
CORRUPTION, COLLUSION AND AMBIGUITY 
Apart from illegitimate state violence, the other major form of state crime is that 
which involves the illegitimate use of state agencies’ powers over the allocation of 
resources. Much of corruption falls under the heading of core state crime: theft and 
fraud which is unambiguously illegal and generally condemned by the public. But 
there is also much about corruption that is legally and morally ambiguous – and its 
ambiguity does not necessarily make it less serious.  
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 In Papua New Guinea, for example, the corruption of greatest concern to local 
civil society activists4 is not so much the blatant scams and embezzlement for which 
the country is notorious (Sharman, 2012) as forms of state-corporate collusion in the 
(sometimes ambiguously) illegal acquisition of land rights (Ward 2016).  
 One of the most important insights to emerge from the economic study of 
corruption is the tendency of states to gravitate towards either a high or low 
equilibrium, i.e. a stable level of corruption (Andvig and Feldstad 2000). Levels of 
corruption appear to be driven by either virtuous or vicious circles. In the virtuous 
circle, because corruption is rare, offering a bribe is risky and accepting one carries 
heavy ‘moral costs’ (guilt and the risk of detection). In the vicious circle, because 
corruption is common, offering a bribe stands a good chance of success with a low 
risk of adverse consequences, and the costs of accepting a bribe are likely to be low. 
As in the case of violence, behaviour that is deviant according to one set of standards 
may amount to conformity to the expectations of those who can apply the most 
effective pressure to the individual actor. In a metaphor used by Hong Kong police 
officers, you can get on the bus (participate in corruption) or run alongside the bus 
(abstain from corruption but not interfere with it), but if you stand in front of the bus 
you are liable to be run over (Kutnjak Ivkovic 2005). 
Corruption is important both as a major form of crime in its own right and as 
a factor in understanding some forms of state violence. For example, the 
vulnerability of certain populations to natural disasters (the 1999 Marmara 
earthquake, Hurricane Katrina in 2005, the Haitian earthquake, and the Pakistan 
floods of 2010) is directly attributable to corrupt decision-making processes and the 
                                                          
We draw here on Kristian Lasslett’s contributions to the research mentioned in n. 1 above. 
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resulting deaths can be considered a form of indirect state violence. Many states 
collude with criminal organizations to carry out violence as well as illicit business 
and numerous violent regimes rely on corrupt networks to sustain their power (see 
e.g. Heyman 1999; Green and Ward 2004). 
At its most extreme, this contradiction between the formal rules of government 
and the real exercise of power manifests itself in a ‘shadow state’ (Reno 1995), where 
the legally constituted system is little more than a façade erected to secure 
international respectability and aid. In Weberian terms such states can be classed as 
‘neo-patrimonial’ (Médard 2001) – patrimonialism (personal and economic ties 
between rulers and subordinates) is the real basis of the rulers’ power, and of such 
domestic legitimacy as they may possess, but the formal structure of authority 
presents itself as a rational-legal one. Bayart et al. (1999) have discussed some 
extreme examples of the ‘criminalization of the state in Africa’, where relatively small 
states such as the Comoros Islands and Equatorial Guinea were largely financed by 
smuggling. Another extreme form of corruption is ‘kleptocracy’ where the theft of 
public resources by a ruling elite appears to be the ruling principle of the state. 
Examples include Liberia under (and before) Charles Taylor and Zaire under Mobutu 
(Schatzberg 1988). 
STATE CRIME AND THE ETHNOGRAPHIC TRADITION 
Given the strong Marxist antecedents informing the study of state violence and 
corruption, it is unsurprising that research in the field has been impelled by three main 
drivers: (a) the political and economic context in which these crimes take place; (b) 
the primacy of victims’ perceptions; and (c) an intimate examination of perpetrator 
agency. Combined with an implicit distrust of state-produced and packaged 
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knowledge researchers are thus led to rely far more on the direct testimony of victims 
and perpetrators and detailed examinations of political economy. 
Criminology has a narrowly drawn but important tradition of ethnographic 
research dating back to the Chicago School of the 1920s and Robert Park’s injunction 
to young scholars to ‘go out and get your hands dirty in real research’ (Park 1966: 71). 
A revival of criminological ethnography in the late 1990s saw the method again 
confined to the marginalized and familiar constituents of criminology’s oeuvre (see in 
particular Ferrell and Hamm 1998) – and also to deviance within the police (e.g. 
Westley 1970; Holdaway 1982, Choongh 1997, Westmarland 2011). 
Where ethnography first begins to address other state crime issues, however, is 
unsurprisingly within the domain, not of criminology, but of anthropology, the 
original home of ethnography (see for example Sluka 1999, Keenan 2009, 2013; and 
Jefferson and Jensen 2009). Mehmet Kurt for example, in studying notions of 
violence, state, religion and belonging in Turkey’s Kurdish Hizbullah employed his 
former status as an imam to secure access and trust from his participants. Kurt 
examines in intimate detail the manner in which Islamic civil society has taken root in 
a region where ethnic identity has been the primary organizing tool against a 
repressive and violent state. Despite the rise of Islamic radicalization in Kurdish South 
East Turkey, almost all scholarly work has focused on mainstream Islamic civil 
society organisations (Jenkins 2008). This body of work concludes that Turkish 
Islamist groups have found a ‘peaceful’ way to compromise with the secular regime 
and the ruling Peace and Development Party’s (AKP) political administration (Turam 
2007). Kurt’s research suggests this is a misleading picture of Islamism in Turkey and 
that Kurdish Islamist CSOs, such as Özgür-Der and Ay-Der, which have flourished in 
the region since at least 2005, are not only becoming increasingly radicalised, but that 
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many hundreds of their members are joining the IS and Al Nusra Front in the jihadist 
war in Syria (Kurt 2015).  
Through ethnographic field work and extensive interviews with members, 
leaders and supporters of Hizbullah we are not only given an insight into the workings 
of a rather clandestine form of ‘civil society’ but an explanation of why Hizbullah has 
proved so attractive to young Kurds and why so many of them have crossed the 
border into Syria to fight with Islamic State. Kurt’s work captures both an Islamist 
response to state criminality and a source of the growth of a new kind of criminal 
state, Islamic State (Kurt 2016 forthcoming).   
NEW DATA, NEW METHODS  
The dangers and difficulties involved in researching state crime continue to 
foster particular forms of creative resourcefulness with regard to methodology and 
access. Those working on state crime are, perhaps, predisposed to seek non-
traditional and alternative data sources given the guarded nature of the subject. 
Accepting that the state does not provide neatly packaged statistical documentation 
on state deviance, and given the critical framework within which these scholars 
work, data is necessarily sought elsewhere. 
 
One of the most innovative methods of securing research access was 
conceived by the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative and its local partners in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, the Centre d’Assistance Medico-Psychosociale 
(CAMPS). In order to interview Mai Mai militia combatants active in the southern 
Kivu province and heavily involved in the perpetration of sexual and other violence, 
lead researcher Michael van Rooyen negotiated with a commanding colonel living in 
the forest outside the town of southern Kivu town of Kamituga. As Kamituga was 
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under the control of the Congolese National Military, researchers negotiated a 48-hour 
amnesty for the combatants who were then required to disarm at the entrance to the 
town before entering for interviews (HHI 2009:13). 
A further example, drawn from one of the authors’ own work, relates to 
negotiating access in an environment of absolute denial. In researching the genocidal 
processes faced by the Muslim ethnic Rohingya in Myanmar, Green and her 
colleagues met a wall of silence when seeking to locate Rohingya detention camps to 
the west of Rakhine state’s capital Sittwe. The Myanmar state denies the very 
existence of the Rohingya identity (use of the term Rohingya is forbidden in the 
country), and because of the complete segregation  which operates in southern 
Rakhine state, locating camps in the region of Mrauk U proved extremely difficult. 
However, with the aid of a GPS, bone rattling bicycles, a UNOCHA5 map and the air 
of naïve tourists it was (after several hours cycling across dry paddy fields and 
peasant tracks) possible to locate a Rohingya village and nearby camp and to conduct 
interviews and observations before being pursued by Myanmar security forces (see 
Green et al 2015).  
 
 While fieldwork remains the central core of data gathering there are rich 
sources to be plumbed beyond the academy: eyewitness accounts from reputable 
journalists and quality print and broadcasting media (see especially the reports and 
films of Egypt’s Mosireen Collective, Robert Fisk, Al Jazeera’s Phil Rees, and John 
Pilger); civil society organizations, former state agents, legal firms, and NGOs can 
provide a wealth of valuable and reliable data. Social media, camera phones, and web 
                                                          
5 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
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technologies have encouraged the phenomenon of ‘citizen journalism’ and thereby 
provided a means through which civil society can reach large global audiences 
without recourse to traditional forms of media. Increasing numbers of human rights 
and advocacy groups have joined forces with citizen journalists (see especially during 
the Arab uprisings of 2011), encouraging them to document abuses in order to 
frustrate censorship and expose state repression, violence and corruption. During the 
Libyan uprising of February 2011 Google set up an account so that anyone in the 
country with a phone could call one of a range of numbers and leave a voice message 
about what was happening on the streets. The message was then automatically 
translated into a tweet in order to evade the communication blackout that Gaddafi’s 
regime had imposed (Al Jazeera 2011). While not an immediately obvious research 
tool Google nonetheless provided a mechanism which allowed real time data to flow 
into the international public domain. 
Other researchers are analyzing social media content in order to source data on 
events which they would otherwise be unable to study (see Saeb Kasm’s work on 
Egypt’s Mosireen Video Collective, 2016 forthcoming). For scholars of state crime 
these developments hold exciting promise but they must also be approached with 
rigorous regard to issues of data verification. Determining the provenance of human 
rights abuse claims through text, images and footage and ascertaining the veracity  
and authenticity of sources is thus opening new methodological challenges to scholars 
drawing on new media data. 
 
As we saw in the section on ‘mapping’, reliable quantitative data on state 
violence are hard to come by, and scholars often have to resort to ‘meta-guesstimates’ 
arrived at by averaging out the widely varying estimates available. Some more 
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sophisticated demographic techniques for estimating death rates are discussed by 
Bijleveld (2008). Hagan and Rymond-Richmond used data from the Darfur Atrocities 
Documentation Project, the US State Department’s survey into genocidal processes in 
Sudan6 to advance their claim that genocide had taken place in Darfur; that a 
criminology of genocide was required; and that such a criminology could be used to 
advocate against genocide (Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 2008). 
A newer methodology which has a particular value for the state crime scholar 
exploring state terror, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and genocide is that of satellite 
earth observation imagery, already pioneered in archaeology for the protection and 
management of cultural heritage. Researchers may hire satellite capacity in order to 
monitor troop or militia movements; village destruction; population displacement; and 
the destruction of farm and pastureland. The costs remain high but the Satellite 
Sentinel Project which was launched by human rights organization Not on Our Watch 
to monitor troop movements in Southern Sudan in 2011 has demonstrated the potential 
of satellite data for researching criminal state practices (http://satsentinel.org/; McGreal 
2010). 
Investigating crimes of powerful state agents can be difficult, harrowing, and 
sometimes dangerous (Schirmer 1998; Nordstrom 2004; Green 2003). One of the 
reasons why so few researchers venture into empirically investigating crimes 
committed by generals, politicians, and state officials is the assumption that access to 
the powerful and their criminogenic processes will be denied. Access to powerful 
                                                          
6 1,136 eyewitnesses in refugee camps in Chad were interviewed by the research team, ‘a 
sample large enough to be a statistically significant representation of the estimated 200,000 




perpetrators may, however (with persistence and tenacity), be less difficult to secure 
than imagined, as the work of many of the authors cited above demonstrates. State 
crime researchers tend, however, to side with those for whom change brings freedom 
from state abuses. In so doing state crime researchers are adopting Scheper-Hughes’ 
notion of ‘ethical orientation’ in which the personal accountability of the researcher is 
answerable to the ‘other’ (Scheper-Hughes 1992: 24). This ethical orientation speaks 
to a commitment to justice and moral alignment with the victims of state violence and 
corruption, in the pursuit of truth and change.  
CONCLUSION  
State crime scholarship is an expanding field and one that is no longer confined to a 
few marginalized critical voices. It remains the case that most work on genocide, 
corruption, torture and other state crimes is not carried out by people who define 
themselves as criminologists; but criminology can provide both a meeting place for 
ideas deriving from other disciplines and make a distinctive contribution through its 
focus on rules, transgression and processes of censure. 
It is over 150 years since Proal (1843: 2) began his pioneering study by 
quoting Seneca’s observation that ‘[t]he desire to rule and the exercise of authority 
teach fraud and violence’. If crime can be defined, as Gottfredson and Hirschi 
argued, as ‘acts of force or fraud undertaken in pursuit of self-interest’ (1990: 15) 
then criminology’s recognition of Seneca’s ancient insight is long overdue. Work 
such as Agnew’s ‘unified’ approach – not to mention the inclusion of this chapter in 
the Oxford Handbook – suggests that mainstream criminology is beginning to take 
notice of the obvious importance of state crime, even if it does not yet occupy a 
place within the discipline commensurate with its scale and destructiveness.   
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